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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THOY BLONQUIST and GRACE
BLONQUIST, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
VS.

SUMMIT COUNTY, A Division of
the STATE OF UTAH; RICHARD
~W. DURRANT, CARLOS L.
POR'l1ER; KENNETH E. WOOLS'l1ENHULME; RONALD R.
ROBINSON and BELVON
BLONQUIST as individuals.
Dcfr-11da11ts 01>1d Respondents.

Case No.
11908

BRIEF O·F RESPONDENTS
S'l1ATEl\IENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District
('on rt of Summit County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Allc•11 B. Sore11se11, Judge, granting the motion for Summary .T ud.L,'"Illent of the individual Respondents and dismissing Appellants' suit against them.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Appellants filed suit on December 28, 1967,
agai1rnt the political entity of Summit County and indi,·i<lunb who were commissioners and officials of Summit
1

County seeking judgment against them for an alleged
willful and intentional interference with the Appellants'
property, specifically a road and gate. Subsequently,
an Amended Complaint, an Answer and Counter Claim
and reply were also filed. Thereafter, the respondents
filed a motion for Summary Judgment on the ground
that no genuine issue of material fact existed. On August
27, 1969, the respondents' motion for Summary Judgment was granted dismissing the appellants' claim for
relief.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent asks that the trial court's order
granting Summary Judgment be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The basic facts of this case leading up to this appeal
involved the use and ownership of the ''South Fork
Road,'' located to the east of the City of Coalville, in
Summit County. Most all of the facts relevant to this
appeal are uncontroverted. The road in question cut
across and extended through the property of the appellants, and the appellants claimed ownership of that portion of the road that did so extend through their property. In the assertion of their belief that a part of the
road belonged to them, the appellants constructed a gate
across the road and maintained a lock upon the gate to
prohibit the use of the road.
Thereafter the Board of County Commissioners of
Summit County, respondents here, on July 3, 1969,
called a public hearing at the Courthouse in Coalville,
2

Utah for the purpose of discussing the road and to determine whether or not Summit County should continue to
maintain it. It was determind that the road had existed
for a period in excess of thirty-two (32) years and that
the County Commission of Summit County, and the
County Commissioners believed that it had always been
a public road under the jurisdiction of Summit County.
Sc'Ycral residents and property owners of Summit
County appeared at that hearing and told the Commissioners that they had traveled the road for in excess of
tl1r preceding ten ( 10) years, and that they had seen
Snmmit County road equipment doing maintenance
work on the road. They also stated that they wished
that the gate and lock be removed from the road. By
sworn affidavit of respondents, Commissioner Porter
a11d Commissioner Woolstenhulme stated that prior to
mm, County equipment was used by Summit County employet•s to gradP the road in question, and that the County
put in and maintained bridges and that County funds
\':en• Pxpen<led in connection with such work.
Following the open hearing, the respondents, Comrnissio1wr Durrant, Commissioner Porter, and Commissio11er \Voolstenhulme gave the appellants written notice
that tht>y intended to continue maintaining said road as
a County road, that appellants should remove the lock
from the gate, and that the County intended to replace
tlw gate with a cattle guard. Appellants took no action
in this regard.
r11 hrrcafter, respondents Durrant, Porter, and Woolst(•nlmlmc sought the advice and council of their legal
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advisor, the duly qualified, elected and acting County
Attorney of Summit County and he advised them th;t
they would, in his opinion, be acting within the course
and scope of their authority as the Board of County Commissioners in removing the gate and installing the cattle
guard, to insure the accessibility and use of the road.
Thereupon, respondents Durrant, Porter, Woolstenhulme, directed respondents Robinson and Blonquist, the
County Sheriff and County Road Supervisor, to remove
the gate and install the cattle guard, which they did after
seeking the advice of the said Summit County Attorney
and being advised that, in his opinion, their action would
be legal and proper and within the scope of their
authority.
All of the individual respondents acted in their official capacities, in good faith, without regard to personal
gain; and, upon the good faith and bona fide belief that
the road was a public road under the jurisdiction of
Summit County and that their actions were legal and
proper in all respects, and required to maintain the usefulness and accessibility of the road.
Thereafter this action was brought against the
named respondent, and a Counter Claim was filed against
the Appellants for notoriously and in defiance of the
rights of the public obstructing a public road and attempting to close the said road to travel by the public.
The aforementioned facts are attested to by affidavits that can be examined in the record. The only areas
4

of eoutention concern the ownership of the road and
whether the order for the removal of the gate in question
\\'as doue in good faith.
ARGUl\H~NT

POINT I
By virtue of Sections 17-5-38 and 42 U.C.A., 1953,

the Board of County Commissioners is vested with the
power to control and manage county roads. Statutes
fnrther provide that:

''If any person ... places, constructs, or maintains ... any structure or object of any kind or
character within the right-of-way of any . . .
eounty road ... without first complying with the
regulations of the high·way authorities having jurisdietion over such right-of-way, said highway
authorities may: (1) Remove such installation
from the right-of-way." 27-12-135 U.C.A., 1953.

Tn addition, the statutes mO\'e any person who places
ohstacle in the right-of-way guilty of a misdemrnnor. (27-12-133 U.C.A., 1953)
snch

<lll

POINT II
The official conduet of a County Sheriff and a
( 'om1tv Road Commissioner may be supervised by the
Board of County Commissioners of the County in which
1Jip~· hold office; and, when they are acting under order
from the Commissi01wrs, they are not liable for acts done
punrnm1t to such orders mid within the scope of their
a ntlwrity.

By statute the Board of County Commissioners of a
County of the State of Utah may supervise the official
conduct of all County officers and see that they faithfully
perform their duties. (17-5-19 U.C.A., 1953). In this case
Commissioners Porter, Durrant and Woolstenhulme had
the authority to direct the actions of County Sheriff
Robinson and County Road Commissioner Blonquist.
Respondents Robinson and Blonquist removed the
gate and lock from the roadway, which gate and lock had
been placed there by the appellant, upon orders. Respondents feel that the order to so remove them was
authorized, liability for the removal of the gate and lock
would not extend to Robinson and Blonquist.
In addition to the law enunciated in the cases cited
in Point III, there is the case of Richardson v. Capwell,
63 Utah 616, 176 Pac. 208 (1918) which was relied upon
by the trial Court. In that case, which has never been
overturned or distinguished, the court held that where a
marshal acted in good faith upon orders issued by one
having the legal authority to supervise his actions (in
that case a justice of the peace) the marshal could not be
held liable even if the actions called for by his supervisors
were not within the scope of their authority.
Respondents Robinson and Blonquist were acting on
orders duly issued by a Board given the legal authority
to supervise their action. In addition, they consulted with
the Summit County Attorney as their legal advisor, as
to the lawfulness of their actions; and, they in no way
personally gained from the actions that were taken. The
6

Lids demonstrate that the actions taken by these two
respondents were in good faith, without malice and under
orders from their statutory supervisors.
Appellants cite the case of Roe v. Lundstrom, 89
et ah 520, J7 P .2d 1128 ( 1936) as one in which stands for
the proposition that malice or bad faith are not elements
of controlling importance in tort cases. However, an
examination of the case demonstrates that it is not rele\"ant to the ease involving the Sheriff or Road Commis;-;ioner or eYen the case involving the County Commissioners in that the police officer involved was in the "commission of an act entirely outside the scope of his official
dntie~·. '' Indeed the following language is found in the
Roe v. Lundstrom case in page 1131:
"It is a general rule that a municipal officer is
immune from liability in a private suit for his acts
in the discharge of corporate duties in the absence
of willful negligence, malice, or corruption constituting misfeance ... and, it is often asserted
tliat where n public officer is by law vested with
discretionary ministerial powers, and acts within
the scope of his authority, he is not liable in damages for au error in judgment unless guilty of corrnption or willful violation of the law."

POINT III
·whrre the respondents, as County Officers, act in
good faith, without malice and within the scope of their
au1h<1rity thr~' are not liable for their actions even where
t lit•re is a mistakr in judgment.

,...
I

Respondents Porter, Durra11t and Woolstenhulme at
all times during the period of the relevant facts of this
case constituted the duly elected, qualified and acting
Board of Commissioners of Summit County. As such,
all of their actions were in the good faith belief that the
road in question was a public road under the jurisdiction
of Summit County and that their actions were legal and
proper in all respects. The said respondents, under such
circumstances would not be personally liable for any
damages suffered by the appellants as a result of sueh
conduct. 37 Am. Jnr. Municipal Corporation, sections 264,
265 and 266; 25 Am. J ur. Highways, section 605; Am.
Jur. Public Officers, sections 273, 274 and 280.
It is m1controverted fact that the respondents considered the problem of what to do about the "South Fork
Road" for some time (R.48), and that the commissioners
called a public meeting on the 3rd day of July, 1967 to
discuss the problem of what to do about the closing of the
road with the gate and lock (R.42). It is admitted that
one of the appellants was in attendance there and that
testimony of residents of Summit County was presented
involving the use of the road by the public for a period
in excess of ten (10) years (see ·Morris v. Blunt 49 Utah
243, 161 1127 (1916) and 27-1-2 U.C.A. 1953 as to the
requirements involved in private road, a public thoroughfare). It is further attested in affidavits of respondents
Porter and Woolstenhulme that prior to 1967, the County
maintained the road and bridges in its course (R. 42).
It is further uncontroverted fact that the respondents all
contacted the Summit County Attorney with regard to
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tlie authority and lawfulness of their anticipated action;
and, each and every one of them were advised that their
aet ions would be legal and proper in all respects. It is
further established and not disputed that the respondents
Porter, Durrant and Woolstenhulme gave written notice
to the appellants that they intended to continue to maintain the road as a county road and that the appellants
remove the gate and lock; and that the action to remove
the gate and lock was undertaken only after appellants
failed to remove them and their removal became necessary for the opening of the road for public use. It can
therefore be seen from these facts that no genuine issue
<lS to any material fact existed. Appellants make the
attempt to raise an issue by impuning bad motive and
malice to the respondents; but, as can be seen from the
facts of the case, there is no substance in fact to support
this contention; i.e., there is no "genuine issue of fact."
Respondents were pursuing a course of action specifically authorized to them by statute (see Point I), they
were aeting as a body politic, and without regard to persoual gain. As such, they are not personally liable for
their actions.

The law in this area has developed over a number of
years and has firmly established the principle that public
officials who act in good faith, without malice are not
liable in tort for actions done in the course of their duties.
The first case in the State of Utah was the case of Garff
c. Smith 31 Utah 102, 86 Pac. M (1906) where a sheep
inspector quarantined a flock of diseased sheep. It was
there held that he, in a quasi-judicial position was not

liable in a civil action for damages where he acted without malice or fraud or corruption. It is admitted that thr
court made a distinction in the case between quasi-judicial and ministerial functions, but under the definitions
of quasi-judicial and ministerial functions the respondents here would have been acting in a quasi-judicial capacity.
The next case of importance was the case of Salt
Lake County v. Clinton, 39 Utah 462 Pac. 1075 (1911)
where the Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake
County had an action brought against it challenging the
legality of their actions in letting bids for advertising and
publishing County Records. The court agreed that the
actions of the Commissioners was improper and illegal,
but went on to say that no recovery could be had against
them in absence of proof of fraud, corruption or bad
faith.

"It is a well-settled rule of law that quasi-judicial
officers cannot be held personally liable for errors
or mistakes while honestly exercising within their
jurisdiction, the judicial or quasi-judicial functions of their offices, however erroneous or misguided their judgment may be. The hearing and
determination by the Board of County Commissioners of the justness or validity of the claim in
question for the publication of the tax list mentioned required the exercise of the judicial, or at
least quasi- judicial functions of the board, and,
in the absence of fraud or corruption on their
nart in allowing and ordering the payment of the
~laim, they cannot he held personally liable therefor."
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In 1929 the important case of Board of Education of
Nebo School District v. Jeppson, 74 Utah 576 280 Pac.
1065, came down. That case was the first to extend judicial or quasi-judicial immunity to ministerial officers
acting under orders of ''official bodies.'' Thereafter in
cases of Logarn City v. Allen, 86 Utah 462, 44 P.2d 1085
(1935) and Roe v. Lundstrorn (discussed supra) reaffirmed this legal position in clear language.
''It is a general rule that a rnwnicival officer is immune from liability in a private suit for bis acts done in
discharge of corporate duties . . . . " (p. 1131)
The most recent case, and a case of controlling importance is the case of Anderson v. Gramite School District, ordering the destruction of an irrigation ditch that
was hampering the construction of a junior high school.
Anderson sued for an injunction, $28,500.00 in compensory damages and $80,000.00 punitive damages, contending that the school district was taking his property. The
ca.Re is very much similar to an instant case in point of
law. In the Anderson case the court clearly enunciated
the controlling rule of law:
''In common with other public officials, they have
authority to do whatever is reasonable necessary
in carrying out the duties imposed upon them.
It would be quite impractical and unfair to require them to act at their own risk. This would
not only be disruptive of the proper functioning
of public institutions, but undoubtedly would dissuade competent and responsible persons from
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accepting the responsibilities of public officr.
Accordingly, it is the settled policy of the law
that when a public official acts in good faith believing what he does to be within the scope of his
authority and in the line of his duty, he is not
liable for damages even if he makes a mistake in
the exercise of his judgment.''
Respondents in this case, as public officials acting
in the scope of their authority, and acting (as was shown
by the pleadings) in good faith and without malice are
uot subject to personal liability for their official act of
removing appellants gate and lock from the roadway.

POINT IV
The facts of this case make it a proper one for the
rendering of a Summary Judgment with the Rules of the
State of Utah.
According to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 56, a defending party can move at any time for Summary Judgment and:
''The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
·with the affidavits, if auy, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law." (Rule 56 U)
In the instant case there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact. Respondents admit that Summary Judg-
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ment should not be rendered lightly or hastily; however,
there are situations where Summary Judgment is a
proper and a necessary remedy. As was stated in the
case of Abdulkadir v. Western. Pacific Railroad Company, 7 Utah 2d. 53, 318 P.2d (1957):
"If they would not establish a basis upon which

plaintiff could recover, no matter how they well
resolved, it would be useless to consume time,
effort and expense in trying them, the saving of
which is the very purpose of Summary Judgment
procedure." ( 341)
Also, as is stated in the case of National America.n
Life Insurance Company v. Bayou Country Clubs, 16
Utah 2d. 417, 403 P.2d 26 (1965):
"The rules permitting Summary Judgments
should not be enlarged by construction yet it
should be liberally interpreted to effectuate their
purpose, to effect the prompt administration of
justice, and to expedite litigations by avoiding
needless trials where no triable issue of fact is
disclosed." (29)
Rule 56 requires that a genuine issue as to a material
fact exists. The only factual dispute that appellants brief
coutends does exist is the spurious claim that the "Respondents, members of Summit County Commission, intentionally, willfully, and deliberately caused a gate and
lock on appellants property to be removed 'knowing full
well that the acts they committed were unlawful anl
wrong.' '' Respondents admit that their actions were
"intentional, willful, and deliberate"; and, that they
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ordered the removal of the gate and lock. They <leny that
the gate and lock \Vere on appellants property, but such a
fact is not relevant to appellants suit for damages, as it
has been brought against the individual respondents.
Respondents further deny that their actions were taken
"knowing full well that the acts they committed were
unlmdul and wrong,'' but this contention was recognized
by the trial judge to have no basis in fact, and clearly
disproved by the affidavits and depositions presented
by the respondents.
In his concurring opm10n m the case of II atch r.
Sugarhouse Finance Company, 20 Utah 2d 156, 434 P.2d
758 ( 1957) Justice _Ealiot made the following statement:
"An attempt to raise an issue is not grounds to
withstand a motion for Summary Judgment when
the facts are set forth in affidavit form, which
facts would be admissible in evick•nce of trial aud
1:mfficient to show that no genuine issue of fact
remains to be tried." U.R.C.P. 56(c) and (e)
As was pointed out in Point III the facts available
from the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions prove that
the respondents were acting in good faith. Appellants
hm'e plead that the respondents acted in bad faith, hut
according to Contiuental Bank and Trust Company v.
Cun11i11gliam, 10 Utah 2d 329, 35:-3 P.2cl (1960):
''The rule permits an excursion beyond the pleading. If facts discovered in the journey irrefutah~y
disprove facts pleaded, Summary Judgment is
appropriate on motion therefo.re. The r.ule : ..
pennits up to pierc<:> the pleadrng, rPsulhng m a
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Summary Judgment, if an examination of the
facts developed under the discovery procedure, by
affidavit, deposition, admission and the like,
makes it appear that no genuine issue of fact is
prosecutable. To travel beyond that point would
be a waste of time, energy and cost. The rule
designedly seeks to eliminate protection, absent
issues of fact, expediting litigation in an area
·where possible congested calendars point up the
truism that justice delayed is justice denied."
(170)
rrhe position that the court can look past the pleadings
to examine the genuineness of a claim is further layed out
in the case of Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d
624 (1960). This case establishes that Summary Judgment is a proper remedy where affidavits reveal that
allegations in a parties' pleadings are without merit and
can not be sustained.

In the case before the bar, the affidavits filed with
the court demonstrate that there are no facts to support
the appellants legal conclusion that the respondents acted in bad faih. The court can look past the assertion to
see that appellants claim is without merit and can not
he sustained.
CONCLUSION
Summary Judgment is a proper remedy where there
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In the instant case, the lower court properly granted respondents
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motion for Summary Judgment because there was no
genuine issue of fact and because public officials are not
personally liable for their official acts done in good faith
and without malice. Such is the case here. This court
should affirm the decision of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT F. ORTON
Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
TEL CHARLIER
425 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondents
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